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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating
to oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2008
through November 1, 2009. The cases examined include decisions
of state and federal courts in the state of Texas and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.'
*Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
** Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 288 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2008, pet. filed) (fraud concealing lease termination and adverse possession of leasehold by
co-tenant); Garner v. Griffin, No. 13-06-621-CV, 2009 WL 200772 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, Jan. 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (cotenant's lease does not repudiate title of other
co-tenants); Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333
(Tex. 2009) (acquiring a Texas lease creates personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defen-
dant); Sun-Key Oil Co. v. Cannon, No. 11-07-00025-CV, 2009 WL 626071 (Tex. App.-
Eastland Mar. 12, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (adverse possession after lease termination for
cessation of production); Headington Oil Co. v. White, 287 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (division order statute interest on unpaid royalties); Berkley
v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 282 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (TRC injec-
tion permit and trespass); Derwen Res., LLC v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 09-07-00597-
CV, 2008 WL 6141597 (Tex. App.-Beaumont May 21, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (am-
biguity in deed); Thompson v. Clayton, No. 08-07-00152-CV, 2009 WL 1620428 (Tex.
App.-El Paso June 10, 2009, no pet.) (easement distinguished from license); Kohout v.
City of Fort Worth, 292 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (permit under
city ordinance); Cambridge Prod., Inc. v. Geodyne Nominee Corp., 292 S.W.3d 725 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (errors in Designation of Unit); BoMar Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Loyd, No. 10-08-00016-CV, 2009 WL 2136404 (Tex. App.-Waco Jul. 15, 2009, pet.
filed), op. on mot. for reh'g, 298 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.-Waco Oct. 14, 2009, pet. denied)
(expenses chargeable to unleased cotenant); Rosenthal v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., No. 03-09-
00015-CV, 2009 WL 2567941 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 20, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(salt water disposal); Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex. LLC,
296 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, pet. filed) (TRC filings make pipeline com-
675
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II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Enerlex, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, Inc. held that a deed that conveyed all
rights in the described lands with a general warranty, but failed to quan-
tify the grantor's interest, was a quitclaim deed. 2 Enerlex sought to avoid
the effect of five unrecorded gift deeds by claiming that Enerlex was a
bona fide purchaser for value.3 The deed into Enerlex conveyed "all
right, title and interest in and to all of the Oil, Gas . . . from the ...
described lands."4 The deed also provided that "Grantor does hereby
warrant said title to Grantee." 5
Enerlex argued that the deed conveyed an interest in property. It was
not restricted to any interest the grantor may have owned, because the
grantor conveyed "all right, title and interest" as opposed to all of "my
right, title, and interest." 6 Enerlex also argued that the deed was not a
quitclaim deed because it contained a general warranty and did not have
"as is" or "without warranty" language.7 The Eastland Court of Appeals
rejected these arguments because the mineral deed did not quantify the
grantor's interest, saying, "It is more significant that at no point in the
deed did [the grantor] warrant or represent that she actually owned any
mineral interest."8 The court of appeals effectively construed the deed as
conveying all of the grantor's interest in the sections conveyed, rather
than a specific interest in certain sections." 9
A conveyance of all of Blackacre with warranty would clearly be a
deed with warranty, not a quitclaim deed, and the grantee would be a
bona fide purchaser as long as he remained without notice of the unre-
corded claim. The court of appeals apparently relied upon the recital that
"[i]t is the intent of Grantor to convey all interest in the said county
whether or not the sections or surveys are specifically described herein"' 0
to hold that the conveyance of "all" of the named sections broadly con-
veys all of the grantor's interest, rather than a specific interest." Because
of the difficulty and uncertainty in correctly describing the lands and
leases conveyed in complex oil and gas assignments, it is a common prac-
tice to include a dragnet clause like the one in this case to catch any inter-
est that was inadvertently omitted or incorrectly described. This case
suggests the practice may inadvertently convert a warranty deed into a
quitclaim deed.
pany common carrier); Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co. v. Enbridge Gathering (NE Tex. Li-
quids), L.P., 298 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (condemnation of
pipeline easements under railroad).
2. 302 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.-Eastland Oct. 8, 2009, no pet.).
3. Id. at 353.
4. Id. at 355 (internal punctuation omitted).
5. Id. at 354.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 355.
8. Id. at 354.
9. Id. at 355.
10. Id. at 354 (internal punctuation omitted).
11. Id. at 355.
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Houchins v. Devon Energy Production Co. held that language in a deed
stating that the grantor retains mineral rights and exempts them from
conveyance is an effective reservation of mineral rights regardless of its
placement within the warranty clause.12 The grantor alleged that he re-
served the mineral rights under a clause that stated "[tlo the extent that
Grantor maintains any mineral rights to the subject property, Grantor
expressly retains such mineral rights to the subject property and exempts
same from the conveyance herein."' 3 The grantee argued that the clause
was not a reservation of the mineral interests, but rather an exception to
the grantor's warranty of title.14 The grantee contended that the location
of the clause within the warranty clause listing other exceptions to title
was indicative of the nature of the clause as an exception to the warranty
rather than a reservation of the minerals.' 5
The Houston First Court of Appeals dismissed grantee's argument by
stating, "Rather than focusing on characterizing the deed language at is-
sue as an 'exception' or a 'reservation,' our primary objective in constru-
ing a deed is to determine the intent of the parties from the four corners
of the deed."' 6 The court of appeals examined the entire deed in order to
give effect to all provisions, "so that none will be rendered meaning-
less."' 7 The court of appeals concluded that the clause was sufficiently
clear to reserve a mineral interest, and its effectiveness was not undercut
by the location of the clause within the deed.18 The significance of
Houchins is the clear holding that a mineral reservation will be given ef-
fect, regardless of its location within the deed, even if it is found within
the warranty clause.
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES
Blackmon v. XTO Energy, Inc. examines the definition of "production
in paying quantities" (PPQ) and determines the appropriate remedy for a
lessee's failure to pay shut-in royalties.19 In Blackmon, "the third party
who had been purchasing the gas produced from [the well at issue] re-
fused to continue because the carbon dioxide content was greater than
three percent." 20 No gas was produced during the time required for the
lessee to install an amine processing unit to make the gas marketable by
removing the excess carbon dioxide. 21 The lessors first alleged that the
oil and gas lease had terminated because the lessee could not sell the gas
without first processing it. The lessors argued that the well was not capa-
12. No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 3321406, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.
15, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *5.
19. 276 S.W.3d 600, 603-04 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.).
20. Id. at 602-03.
21. Id. at 603.
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ble of PPQ "because it needed additional equipment or repairs in order
to produce 'marketable gas." 22
The Waco Court of Appeals, however, focused on whether the well was
capable of producing gas in marketable quantity, not marketable quality.
The court of appeals stated that the "[w]ell was connected to pipeline
facilities and was capable of producing a high volume of raw gas at the
wellhead." 23 Therefore, the processing unit "was not the type of 'addi-
tional equipment' necessary to enable gas to flow from the wellhead in a
producing quantity."24 Rather, the processing unit was installed to
render the gas to be "marketable quality." 25 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the well was "capable of flowing from the wellhead . .. in a
marketable quantity regardless of whether the . . . processing unit was
installed downstream"; thus, "the well was capable of [PPQ] when it was
shut in."26 The court of appeals further noted that the processing unit
required to process the carbon dioxide out of the gas produced was in-
stalled downstream of the wellhead.27 The court of appeals reasoned that
those cases holding that this type of equipment is a post-production cost
further supported its conclusion that the equipment was not necessary to
actually produce the gas.28
The lessors next alleged that the lessee's failure to pay shut-in royalties
resulted in the automatic termination of the lease. 29 The court of appeals
focused on whether this particular shut-in royalty provision created a spe-
cial limitation, a condition subsequent, or a covenant.30 The court of ap-
peals noted that "[i]n case of doubt as to the true construction of a clause
in a lease, it should be held to be a covenant, and not a condition or
limitation, as the law does not favor forfeitures." 3 1 Leases utilizing an
"unless" form and providing that the payment of shut-in royalties is a
form of constructive production have routinely been held to create a spe-
cial limitation that will terminate the lease if the shut-in royalty is not
paid. 32 However, the lease in this case provided that if a well were shut-
in, the lease would continue, but if the well were shut-in for a continuous
ninety days, the lessee "shall pay" shut-in royalties.33 "For breach of [a]
mere covenant the lessor has no right of reentry, unless . . . there is an
express clause in the agreement to this effect, but has the right to sue for
damages only." 34 Because the lease in this case was a covenant and be-
cause there was no express clause divesting the estate of the lessee, the
22. Id.
23. Id.





29. Id. at 605.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 606.
33. Id. at 605.
34. Id. at 606 (quoting Johnson v. Gurley, 52 Tex. 222, 226-27 (1879)).
678 [Vol. 63
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
court of appeals held that the provision for payment of shut-in royalties
could only be enforced by a suit for money damages.3 5
The significance of this case is that it sharpens and narrows the analysis
required to determine whether a well is capable of PPQ. This court drew
a line between the equipment necessary to produce gas and the equip-
ment required to make the gas marketable (the equipment which is nor-
mally included in post-production costs). That is, the equipment
necessary for the gas to flow when the well is turned "on" does not in-
clude all of the equipment necessary to make the gas marketable. This
court cited with approval the Texas Supreme Court's opinion holding that
for a well to be capable of PPQ, "there must be facilities located near
enough to the well that it would be economically feasible to establish a
connection so that production could be marketed at a profit."36 Appar-
ently, the connection to a pipeline is "near enough," but there is nothing
in this opinion to indicate whether the production could be marketed "at
a profit." Presumably, profitability was uncontested.
Blackmon also demonstrates that when a shut-in royalty provision is
determined to be a covenant by the court, that covenant may be enforced
only by a suit for money damages and not by a suit for lease termina-
tion.37 Stated more generally, under a "shall pay" shut-in royalty clause
coupled with a provision that the mere existence of a shut-in well capable
of producing in paying quantities is constructive production, the failure to
pay shut-in royalties will not result in lease termination.
Vortt Exploration Co. v. EOG Resources, Inc. held that two separate
saving clauses (force majeure and shut-in royalty) can be stacked to save
a lease, but the lessee must comply with the terms of each to perpetuate
the lease. 38 For adverse possession to be adverse under a terminated
lease, there must be a new well, a recompletion, production, or sales. 3 9
An oil and gas lease executed in 1980 with a primary term of two years
was held into the secondary term by PPQ. In November 2001, the gas
purchaser stopped taking gas from the well, and the well was discon-
nected from the pipeline. In February 2006, "a pipeline connection be-
came available," but "the well was not equipped to produce" because the
"gas could not enter the pipeline without a compressor." 4 0 The well was
never reconnected. 41 On March 24, 2006, notice was sent to the lessee as
required by this particular lease that the shut-in royalty payments were
delinquent. 4 2 On July 21, 2006, the lessee tendered shut-in royalties. 4 3
35. Id. at 607.
36. Id. at 603 (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 559
(Tex. 2002)).
37. Id. at 607.
38. No. 11-07-00159-CV, 2009 WL 1522661 (Tex. App.-Eastland May 29, 2009, pet.
granted) (mem. op.).
39. See id. at *8.
40. Id. at *4-6.
41. Id. at *1, *4.




The shut-in royalty clause in the lease read as follows:
While there is a gas well on said land or on lands pooled therewith
and if gas is not being sold or used off the premises for a period in
excess of three full consecutive calendar months, and this lease is not
then being maintained in force and effect under the other provisions
hereof, Lessee shall tender or pay to Lessor .... If such payment of
shut-in royalty is so made or tendered by Lessee to Lessor, it shall be
considered that this lease is producing gas in paying quantities and
this lease shall not terminate, but remain in force and effect.44
The lessee contended that the lease continued in force and effect under
the force majeure clause and the shut-in royalty clause. 45 Lessee also as-
serted adverse possession under the three-year and five-year statutes.46
Under the habendum clause of the lease, once the primary term ended,
the lease was to remain in effect "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other
mineral is produced from said land or land with which said land is pooled
hereunder." 47 An oil and gas lease creates a fee simple determinable that
will automatically terminate, absent some other lease provision, "upon
the happening of the event by which it is limited." 48 Here, "that event is
a cessation of production." 49 The lessee argued that although production
ceased in November 2001, the lease was still in effect because the lease
contained a force majeure clause that excused any failure to produce the
well, and because shut-in royalties were paid, there was constructive
production.50
"A force majeure clause in an oil and gas lease excuses a lessee from
nonperformance of obligations contained in the lease if the nonperform-
ance 'is caused by circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the
lessee."' 51 However, here, "even if the force majeure clause applied to
the original cessation of production[,] . . . a pipeline connection became
available in February 2006."52 Thus, "under the very best scenario" for
the lessee, when the pipeline connection again became available in Febru-
ary 2006, the event triggering the force majeure clause no longer ex-
isted. 53 The lessee then had "ninety days to either resume production or
to pay shut-in royalty." 54 The lessee failed to carry out either option.55
Shut-in royalty payments are paid as a substitution for production.56
To perpetuate a lease by paying shut-in royalties when a well is not actu-
44. Id. at *5.
45. Id. at *4, *5.
46. Id. at *8.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *4-5.
51. Id. at *4 (citing RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.11 (3d
ed. 1991)).
52. Id. (internal emphasis omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *5.
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id. at *5.
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ally producing, the payment must be timely or the lease will terminate
under the habendum clause.57
The Eastland Court of Appeals relied upon evidence that the well
could not enter a pipeline without a compressor, to conclude that "the
well was not capable of production in paying quantities at the time it was
shut in." 58 A "shut-in royalty clause will not extend the term of the
lease" if the well is not "capable of producing in paying quantities at the
time it is shut-in." 59
Notice was sent to the lessee (as required under this particular lease)
on March 24, 2006, notifying the lessee that shut-in payments were delin-
quent, but it was not until July 21, 2006, that the lessee tendered shut-in
royalties. The court held that because shut-in royalties were tendered
more than ninety days after the pipeline connection became available in
February 2006, the lease terminated for lack of production, even if the
well was capable of PPQ.60 It was not perpetuated by the payment of
shut-in royalties, because the payment was not timely.61 The opinion is
silent as to whether the "shall pay" provision in the shut-in royalty clause
could have made payment a covenant, rather than a condition.
Finally, the lessee argued that it re-acquired title to the leasehold under
the three-year and five-year statutes of limitation.62 The court of appeals
rejected this argument because the holdover by the lessee was not ad-
verse; the court stated that "[t]here was no evidence that it drilled a new
well, recompleted an existing well in a new formation, produced any oil
or gas, or sold any production from this lease."63
Vortt Exploration illustrates that while lease savings clauses can be
stacked to save a lease (e.g. force majeure plus shut-in royalty), the lessee
still must comply with the terms of each clause to perpetuate the lease. It
also lists the activities which may be "adverse" under the statute of limi-
tations when a holdover lessee continues to operate. 64
Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton held that the owner of executive
rights has no duty to lease.65 Newton owned all of the surface rights, an
undivided one-fourth mineral interest, and all of the executive rights for
the entire tract. When Newton refused to lease, Aurora Petroleum filed
suit on behalf of all the non-participating mineral owners and sought to
force Newton to enter into a lease. Aurora Petroleum claimed that
Newton, as the holder of the executive right, had a duty to lease.66
57. Id. at *6.
58. Id. at *5-6.
59. Id. at *5 (citing Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 S.W.2d
427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no pet.)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *8.
63. Id. at *8.
64. See generally id.
65. 287 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.).
66. Id. at 375.
2010] 681
SMU LAW REVIEW
In Manges v. Guerra, a Texas Supreme Court decision froml984, the
holder of the executive right (Manges) leased the property to himself at
terms that were more advantageous to him than to the non-participating
mineral owners. 67 The supreme court held that Manges breached a fiduci-
ary duty owed to the non-participating mineral owners.68 In Aurora Pe-
troleum, the Amarillo Court of Appeals distinguished Manges, because
the duty of the executive right owner could arise only after the oil and gas
lease were granted. There was no lease in this case, so the Manges fiduci-
ary duty was not applicable. 69
The court of appeals equated the duty to lease with the duty to de-
velop. In In re Bass,70 the Texas Supreme Court stated that "a duty to
develop a mineral estate arises not from a fiduciary relationship, but from
the implied covenant doctrine of contracts law in which courts read a
duty to develop into an oil and gas lease when necessary to effectuate the
parties' intent."7 1 The Aurora Petroleum court concluded that the duty to
lease (develop) could not be based on a fiduciary duty, but only on an
implied contractual covenant.72 Under the facts of the case, the non-par-
ticipating mineral interests apparently were subject to a reversion to the
fee owner (Newton) if production were not obtained.73 The opinion is
silent on this point, but it clearly suggests that Newton's interests were
not aligned with the non-participating owners. Also, it is arguably im-
plied in the creation of a term interest that some effort will be made to
obtain production. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that because
Newton never entered into an oil and gas lease, there could not be an
implied duty to develop. 74 Newton's obligation to the non-participating
mineral interest owners was to secure for the non-participating mineral
owners the right to share in the same benefits Newton acquired for
Newton. Because Newton did not lease their interest or acquire any ben-
efit for himself, there was not a breach of fiduciary duty to the non-partic-
ipating mineral interest owners.75 The significance of this case is the
holding that the owner of the executive rights has no duty to lease.76
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS
XTO Energy Inc. v. Smith Production Inc. held that a non-consent elec-
tion under a 1982 American Association of Petroleum Landmen form
Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) as to subsequent drilling operations is
67. 673 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Tex. 1984).
68. Id. at 183-84.
69. Aurora Petroleum, 287 S.W.3d at 376.
70. 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. 2003).
71. Id.
72. See Aurora Petroleum, 287 S.W.3d at 377 (quoting In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743
(Tex. 2003)).
73. Id. at 375.
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final when made.77 Pursuant to two JOAs "based on the American Asso-
ciation of Petroleum Landmen Model Form Operating Agreement 610-
1982[,]" the operator gave written notice to the non-operators of its pro-
posal to drill four new wells.]8 The JOA gave the non-operators thirty
days to elect to participate or go "non-consent." One of the non-opera-
tors (the Non-Consenting Party) gave notice to the operator that it was
electing not to participate in drilling the wells. 7 9 Then, within the thirty-
day election period provided in the JOA, the Non-Consenting Party sent
the operator a letter stating that it was electing to participate, that it was
revoking its prior notification to the contrary, and that the election not to
participate had been sent in error. Notwithstanding the second notice,
the operator continued to treat the non-operator as a Non-Consenting
Party under the JOA. The Non-Consenting Party brought suit against the
operator for breach of contract.80
In a matter of first impression, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals concluded that "under the unambiguous language of the agree-
ments, such a party may not change its election after it gives notice of its
election to the proposing party."81
Article VI.B of the JOA in this case generally tracks the form of the
1982 Model Form Operating Agreement and provides the procedures the
parties to the JOA must follow when a new well is proposed. Article
VI.B provides in part:
B. Subsequent Operations:
1. Proposed Operations: Should any party hereto desire to drill any
well on the Contract Area other than the [initial well], . . . the party
desiring to drill . . . such a well shall give the other parties written
notice . . . . The parties receiving such a notice shall have thirty (30)
days after receipt of the notice within which to notify the party wish-
ing to do the work whether they elect to participate in the cost of the
proposed operation . . .. Failure of a party receiving such notice to
reply within the period above fixed shall constitute an election by
that party not to participate in the cost of the proposed operation.82
Thus, "[i]f the Consenting Parties comply with the requirements of Arti-
cle VI.B.2." by drilling the well as proposed, "then the interest of any
Non-Consenting Party is subject to the Non-Consent" penalties included
in the JOA,83 which in this case included a 400% penalty on drilling
costs.84
The JOA is silent as to whether the Non-Consenting Party may, change
its election. The Non-Consenting Party argued that the JOA was "unam-
77. 282 S.W.3d 672, 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. granted).
78. Id. at 674.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 674-75.
81. Id. at 674.
82. Id. at 677 (quoting from the JOA).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 675.
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biguous and allowed the [Non-Consenting Party] to change its election
within thirty days of receiving [the] notices," or [i]n the alternative, that
the JOA [was] ambiguous."85 The court of appeals disagreed and held
that "allowing such a change in election would conflict with the intent of
the parties as expressed in the unambiguous language of Article VI.B."8 6
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals used the "four corners"
approach to ascertain the intentions of the parties.87 In applying this ap-
proach, the court of appeals examined the two JOAs "in their entirety in
an effort to harmonize and give effect to all of their provisions so that
none will be rendered meaningless."8 8 The court of appeals found that
the timing of the procedures set forth in Article VI was consistent with
the intent not to allow changes to elections by the receiving parties.89
Article VI of the JOA "require[es] the proposing party to notify the Con-
senting Parties of any Non-Consenting Party 'immediately after' the expi-
ration of the Notice Period" and also requires that proposed operations
must be commenced within ninety days after the expiration of the notice
period.90 The court of appeals stated, "Construing Article VI to not al-
low changes in election by the receiving parties is consistent with the pro-
visions of the JOA."91
The timing of required events under Article VI of the JOAs, accompa-
nied by the time-sensitive nature of drilling operations (i.e., the proposing
party must make financial arrangements, begin drilling within ninety days
of the expiration of the notice period, and pursue operations with due
diligence), led the court of appeals to conclude that the operator's con-
struction of the JOA was "the only reasonable construction of the lan-
guage at issue."92 In this case, all of the non-operators made their
election before the Non-Consenting Party changed its election, but that
was not a factor the court of appeals deemed relevant. The court of ap-
peals expressly held that the notice period provided in the JOA expired
as to the Non-Consenting Party when the Non-Consenting Party gave no-
tice of its election.93
The significance of the case is the holding that, under a very common
form of JOA, an election to go "non-consent" as to subsequent drilling
operations is final when made and cannot be revoked.94 It cannot be
revoked even if the revocation is within the thirty days originally given
under the form JOA to the non-operator to make an election or even if
85. Id. at 675-76.
86. Id. at 678-79.
87. Id. at 676.
88. Id. (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652
(Tex. 1999)).
89. Id. at 678.
90. Id. at 679
91. Id. at 678-79.
92. Id. at 679-80.
93. Id. at 677-78.
94. See id. at 682.
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the general notice period is still open because some other non-operator
has not yet elected.
Virginia Power Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Apache Corp. held that a
"reasonable efforts" contract provision does not trump a force majeure
clause so as to require delivery to alternate delivery points on a pipeline
damaged by hurricanes.95 Apache agreed to deliver gas to Virginia
Power at two specific points on a pipeline subsequent hurricanes dam-
aged Apache's production facilities and pipeline. One delivery point was
damaged and not capable of delivering the contract quantity.96 There
was a sufficient quantity of gas available at the second delivery point to
satisfy Virginia Power and all of Apache's other buyers. Apache deliv-
ered more than the minimum contract quantity to one third-party buyer
and reduced the quantity of gas to Virginia Power and the other buyers
by about fifty percent. Apache ranked the buyers and disproportionately
reduced the allocation to Virginia Power to conform to Apache's internal
allocation of a specific source (i.e., specific platforms) of the gas supply
delivered to that delivery point.97 That specific platform dedication was
not part of the Virginia Power contract.98 Virginia Power covered the
shortfall at a higher price in the spot market from various sellers, includ-
ing Apache. Virginia Power then offset its increased costs against
Apache. 99
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Apache could rely
upon the force majeure clause in the North American Energy Standards
Board (NAESB) base contract, which specifically mentioned hurri-
canes. 00 The base contract did not define "reasonable efforts." In bal-
ancing the tension between the requirement to make "reasonable efforts"
to avoid invoking force majeure and the force majeure clause itself, the
court of appeals relied upon the rule of construction that a contract
should not be construed in a way that would render portions of it mean-
ingless.101 The court of appeals held that to require Apache to make de-
liveries at an alternate point because of the hurricane damage would
render the contract provisions on specific delivery points and force
majeure meaningless.102 The court of appeals also rejected a similar stat-
utory substitute performance argument based on UCC § 2-614,103 be-
cause the statutory provision is a "gap-filler" provision that applies only if
the parties do not have a specific agreement. 104
It was undisputed that the first delivery point was damaged and incapa-
ble of delivering the specified quantity. However, Virginia Power con-
95. 297 S.W.3d 397, 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
96. Id. at 401.
97. Id. at 408.
98. Id. at 406.
99. Id. at 401.
100. Id. at 404-05.
101. Id. at 403-04.
102. Id.
103. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.614(a) (Vernon 2009).
104. Va. Power, 297 S.W.3d at 405.
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tended that Apache could have delivered the contract quantities at the
second delivery point. 105 Apache again invoked the force majeure clause,
which only applied under the NAESB base contract if "the hurricanes
caused a 'loss or failure of [its] gas supply."' 106 The term "gas supply"
was not defined in the contract. 107 The issue was ultimately determined
to present a fact question that could not be resolved in a summary judg-
ment proceeding. 108 However, the court of appeals did discuss the mean-
ing of "gas supply" under the NAESB contract and the right of a seller to
allocate the available gas supply among multiple buyers. 109
Apache contended that it was a common industry practice to internally
allocate specific sources of supply (certain platforms) to specific delivery
points. However, Apache presented no evidence that effectively sup-
ported that argument, and Virginia Power did present evidence that con-
tested Apache's custom and usage claim. Therefore, the court of appeals
proceeded on the basis of the plain and ordinary meaning of "gas sup-
ply."110 It concluded that the meaning of "gas" was clear but the mean-
ing of "supply" was not. Apache's evidence did not address the effect of
the hurricanes on all the possible sources of supply but only on those
platforms that Apache had internally designated as allocable to the first
delivery point. Therefore, Apache left open the fact question as to
whether or not it could have delivered the gas at the second delivery
point.'
Moreover, the court of appeals held that even if it accepted Apache's
narrow definition of "gas supply," there was still a fact issue as to
Apache's ability to deliver gas. The record showed that enough gas was
delivered to meet the contract requirements of all five buyers, but that
one of those buyers took a disproportionately large amount over the min-
imum contract volume specified in its contract.112 Apparently Virginia
Power and the third-party buyer held different priorities or rankings in
the event that deliveries were curtailed, but there was nothing in the re-
cord to explain the rankings. The court of appeals held that existing au-
thority supporting allocations in the event of a shortage (without
additional evidence from Apache) would not support a disproportionate
allocation when there was no shortage.113
The significance of the case is that it illustrates how the simple and
basic terms of the NAESB contract leave many issues open for contro-
versy. It clarifies the relationship between events of force majeure and




108. Id. at 409.
109. Id. at 405-07.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 407-08.
112. Id. at 408.
113. Id. at 408-409 (citing Tejas Power Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 14-98-00346-
CV, 1999 WL 605550, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 12, 1999, no pet.)).
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gas supply and allocations among multiple buyers highlights the lack of
specificity in the simple NAESB contract.
Dynegy Midstream Services, L.P. v. Apache Corp. held that for gas sold
at the wellhead under common "percentage of proceeds" contracts, the
gas processor was not obligated to compensate the producer for drips or
condensate gathered before the gas reached the processing plant or for
unaccounted-for gas lost between the wellhead and the tailgate of the
processing plant.' 1 4 Apache, the producer, entered into multiple "per-
centage of proceeds" contracts (covering production in Texas and New
Mexico). Pursuant to these contracts, Apache transferred title to gas it
produced to the processor (which also owned the gathering system) at or
near its wellheads and received a percentage of the proceeds from the
"sales of residue gas at the tailgate" of various processing plants.11 5
Apache contended it should be compensated for condensate gathered
before the gas reached the processing plant and for unaccounted-for gas
that disappeared between production at the wellheads and the sale at the
tailgate of the processing facilities. Apache sued for breach of contract,
for violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (the Act), and for
"a declaratory judgment on whether [it] was entitled to payment for con-
densate collected at compressor booster stations."116
Typical "percentage of proceeds" contracts, like Apache's contracts,
determine payment to the producer based on the amount of gas sold at
the tailgate of the processing plant.117 "The parties were free to appor-
tion the risk of pipeline losses or other losses as they wished.""i8 How-
ever, there were no provisions in Apache's contracts requiring the
processor to meet "efficiency targets with respect to leakage" or to com-
pensate Apache for unaccounted-for gas." 9 Apache's payment "was lim-
ited to a percentage of the proceeds from actual sales," but Apache was
seeking to recover "for sales that never occurred."1 20 Accordingly, "con-
tract damages for gas lost between the wellhead and the tailgate were not
recoverable."121
The Act covers unfair and deceptive trade practices that include mis-
representations.12 2 "Recovery of actual damages under the [Act]" re-
quires an injury and a causal relationship between the misrepresentation
and the injury.12 3 However, the alleged misrepresentations of the gas
processor related to the failure to pay Apache for unaccounted-for gas.1 2 4
Because the gas processor was not obligated "to pay Apache for unac-
114. 294 S.W.3d 164, 174 (Tex. 2009).
115. Id. at 169.
116. Id. at 167.




121. Id. at 170.





counted-for gas that was never sold," even if the Act was applicable and
the misrepresentations were made, Apache was not injured, and there
could be no recovery under the Act.125
Title to the gas was transferred at or near the wellhead.126 Therefore,
the liquids and condensate "from the gas stream downstream of the well-
heads," removed at compressor stations, were owned by the gas proces-
sor.12 7 The contracts provided that Apache would be paid for liquids that
were saved and sold at the processing plant.128 The compressor stations
were not processing plants, and "gas liquids were not 'saved and sold' at
the compressor stations." 129 "Liquid field condensate drops out of the
gas stream because of changes in pressure and temperature, and must be
removed from the gathering system to prevent blockage."' 30 The liquids
are not marketable until impurities are removed.' 3 ' Further, "ten of the
eleven contracts expressly provid[ed] that any liquids exiting the gas
stream en route to the final processing plants" belonged to the proces-
sor.1 3 2 None of the "percentage of proceeds" contracts specified "that
condensate precipitating at compressor stations is treated differently
from condensate precipitating at any other point in the gathering sys-
tem."133 Accordingly, the processor was not obligated to account to
Apache for "condensate that fell out of the gas stream at the ... compres-
sor stations."134
Dynergy Midstream Services is a reminder that parties to a "percentage
of proceeds" contract are free to apportion the risk of pipeline losses and
to allocate the proceeds of production in the contract. If a producer
wants to further apportion the risk of pipeline loss, the producer should
ensure that the "percentage of proceeds" contract contains efficiency
thresholds and that the contract requires the processor to account for
losses that exceed the specified thresholds. Similarly, if a producer wants
to share in the proceeds from liquids collected out of field separators,
drips, or compressor stations, then the contract must specify that the pro-
ducer will share in proceeds for products extracted at points other than
the tailgate of the processing plant.
ERG Resources, LLC v. Merlon Texas, Inc. held that an assignment
conveying the assignor's "right, title, and interest" in certain lands as of a
specified effective date and "the personal property thereon" conveys the





129. Id. at 173.
130. Id. at 172.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 173.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 174.
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was produced.13 5 Paragraph one of the assignment conveyed assignor's
"right, title, and interest in [the Land] .. . including .. . without limitation,
the properties and/or oil and gas units located thereon, . . . together
with . . . the personal property thereon, appurtenant thereto, or used or
obtained in connection with said properties and/or oil and gas units." 1 3 6
Paragraph five of the assignment conveyed the assignor's "right, title, and
interest in and to the oil, gas of any kind and nature, other hydrocarbons
and other minerals in, on and produced from or allocated to the leasehold
interest sold to [assignee] from and after the Effective Date hereof."137 It
was undisputed that the "[o]il . . . severed from the Land by production
[was] personal property."1 38 The assignor contended that the oil in stor-
age on the land as of the effective date, but produced prior to the effec-
tive date, belonged to the Assignor. 1 3 9
The Houston First Court of Appeals held:
[P]aragraph 5 gives [the assignor] a mineral interest-an interest in
the oil and gas in place as of the Effective Date of the Assignment.
Paragraph 5 does not conflict with paragraph 1. Paragraph 1 ad-
dresses the conveyance of all kinds of personal property, including
the oil "thereon" the Land, while paragraph 5 addresses the convey-
ance of the oil and gas in place. 140
Thus, the oil and gas in place passed as of the effective date by paragraph
five, and the personal property on the land was conveyed as of the effec-
tive date by paragraph one. 141 The court of appeals found that the lan-
guage used in paragraph five is the language that "is historically used to
transfer a mineral estate, that is, the oil, gas, and other minerals in place,
not severed from the ground." 14 2 Presumably, it was the "in, on and pro-
duced from" language that the court of appeals found persuasive.14 3
Purchase and sale agreements and assignments frequently use a series
of descriptive paragraphs to describe the property interests to be trans-
ferred. It is common to describe the oil and gas leases to be conveyed
and the personal property located thereon. Generally, the parties are
thinking in terms of wellhead and surface equipment when using that lan-
guage. It is also common to have an effective date provision to allocate
between the parties the right to the production and the obligation to bear
the costs. This generally works for gas, which is not usually in storage,
but oil in the tanks creates a special issue. ERG Resources is significant
135. No. 01-08-01007-CV, 2009 WL 3491049, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.
29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *4.
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *4.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Gex v. Tex. Co., 337 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
143. See generally id.
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because it highlights the careful draftsmanship required to carry out the
parties' intent as to oil in storage.
V. REGULATIONS
In Anadarko E & P Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a permit issued by the Texas Railroad Com-
mission (TRC) granting a well-spacing exception under Statewide
Rule 37144 (Rule 37) without proper notice was void, not voidable, and
that lease geometry could be considered by the TRC in granting an ex-
ception.14 5 An offset owner argued that the operator of the Barksdale
Well No. 8 (the Well) failed to establish under Rule 37 that the Well "was
necessary to prevent waste" and, because the offset owner was not given
notice, that the original permit was void. 146
"Rule 37 allows the [TRC] to grant an exception to the spacing re-
quirements thereunder on two grounds: to prevent waste and to prevent
the confiscation of property." 1 4 7 The court of appeals noted:
The supreme court has defined the term "waste", as used in Rule 37,
to mean 'the ultimate loss of oil.148 Under this definition, the court
explained that a Rule 37 exception to prevent waste may be justified
if a substantial amount of oil or gas that otherwise would ultimately
be lost will be saved by the drilling of a well .... To obtain a Rule 37
exception to prevent waste, it must be shown that . .. closer spacing
of wells is necessary to recover the hydrocarbons. 149
The court of appeals further stated that:
[T]o obtain a Rule 37 exception, [the operator] was required to show
that unusual conditions-i.e., different from conditions in adjacent
parts of the field-existed under the tract for which the exception
was sought; that as a result of these unusual conditions, hydrocar-
bons cannot be recovered by any existing well or by additional wells
drilled at "regular" locations; and that the volume of otherwise unre-
coverable hydrocarbons is substantial.150
The court of appeals found that the record demonstrated that the unit
on which the Well was located was "an irregularly shaped unit with a
144. In relevant part, Rule 37 provides:
No well for oil, gas, or geothermal resource shall hereafter be drilled nearer
than 1,200 feet to any well completed in or drilling to the same horizon on
the same tract or farm, and no well shall be drilled nearer than 467 feet to
any property line, lease line, or subdivision line; provided the commission, in
order to prevent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property, may grant
exceptions to permit drilling within shorter distances . ...
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(a)(1) (2010) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Statewide Spacing).
145. Anadarko E & P Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., No. 03-04-00027-CV, 2009 WL
47112, at *7, *14 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
146. Id. at *12.
147. Id. at *12 (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(a)(3)).
148. Id. (citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atl. Ritchfield Co., 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (Tex. 1939)).
149. Id. (citing Wrather v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex. 1948)).
150. Id.
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panhandle section" on which no regular locations existed, "although reg-
ular locations [did] exist on the unit."151 "The Well was located in the
panhandle section of the unit equidistant from east and west lines."152
"The evidence showed that [there was a] rapid depositional environment"
in the area of the Well.' 53 "The evidence [further] showed that [the]
rapid depositional environment would impact the heterogeneity, permea-
bility, and porosity in the area of [the Well]."1 5 4 Based on this evidence,
the TRC "determined that the lease geometry of the panhandle section
coupled with the impact of the rapid depositional environment consti-
tuted an unusual condition that precluded the reservoir from being ade-
quately drained by wells at regular locations."' 55 Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded that there was "a reasonable basis in the record . . . to
support the [TRC's] finding of unusual conditions at the location of [the
Well].1 56
The working interest owner argued that the TRC's "order was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence because the [TRC's] consideration of
'lease geometry' was improper."' 57 The court of appeals noted that "[i]n
considering whether to grant a Rule 37 exception to prevent waste, the
[Texas Supreme Court] has held that the [TRC] need not confine its anal-
ysis to the sole question as to whether [a] well will save oil that otherwise
would be lost."' 5 8 "Rather, 'the [TRC] should be left reasonably free to
exercise its sound judgment and discretion,' keeping in mind that the
[TRC's] duty is to conserve oil and gas above ground as well as below."159
The court of appeals held that the TRC may consider factors beyond
mere geology in determining whether requirements necessary to grant a
Rule 37 exception to prevent waste have been met.160 Therefore, the
court of appeals rejected the working interest owner's claim that the TRC
"was forbidden from considering lease geometry when determining
whether a Rule 37 exception should have been granted to prevent
waste."161
The working interest owner further argued that the TRC's "order was
not supported by substantial evidence because the [TRC] failed to make
a finding that no well at a regular location would drain the hydrocarbons
to be recovered by [the Well]." 1 6 2 "Contrary to this assertion, the TRC
expressly determined . . . that [the] lease geometry coupled with the im-
pact of the depositional environment would preclude the panhandle sec-






157. Id. at *14.







tion of the [unit] from being drained 'by wells at regular locations."'1 6 3
The court of appeals, therefore, rejected the working interest owner's
argument. 164
There was also a procedural point of some significance. Rule 37 re-
quires that notice of hearing be given to certain offset owners, and the
issue was the effect of a Rule 37 exception which is granted under circum-
stances where the offset owner did not receive notice. 165
The plain language of Rule 37 places the burden of correctly identi-
fying affected persons squarely upon the applicant . ... It is there-
fore incumbent upon the applicant for a Rule 37 exception to ensure
that the correct parties have been identified so that the Commission
may provide proper notice to those parties.' 66
The court of appeals stated that "[i]n the absence of proper notice, we
conclude that the Commission did not err in declaring the original permit
'void'-i.e., the production was illegal from its inception-rather than
'voidable."' 16 7
Anadarko E & P is significant because it confirms that the TRC may
consider factors beyond mere geology in determining whether require-
ments necessary to grant a Rule 37 exception to prevent waste have been
satisfied. Specifically, the configuration of the lease may be consid-
ered.168 The holding that a permit issued under a Rule 37 exception is
void, not voidable, is also significant. Further, production under a void
permit is illegal from inception. 169
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co. held that the Texas Natural
Resources Code creates private causes of action for breach of the statu-
tory duties to properly plug wells and not commit waste, and establishes
that subsequent owners do not have standing to sue prior owners "for
injury to realty [which occurred] before the subsequent owner acquired
his interest."o70 Exxon Corporation (Exxon) held mineral leases subject
to a fifty-percent royalty covering several thousand acres in Refugio
County, Texas. During the 1980s, after negotiations to reduce the royalty
failed, "Exxon systematically plugged and abandoned [its] wells," be-
cause the leases were no longer profitable. 171 After the leases termi-
nated, Emerald Oil & Gas Company (Emerald) acquired a portion of the
leases and "attempted to reenter the wells" but encountered unexpected
difficulties.172 Emerald alleged that Exxon caused those difficulties by
intentionally sabotaging the wells during Exxon's plugging and abandon-
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *8.
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. Id. at *7.
168. Id. at *14.
169. Id. at *7.
170. No. 05-0729, 2009 WL 795760, *2, *4-5 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009), reh'g granted Nov. 20,
2009.
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id.
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ment of the leases. Among other claims, Emerald sued Exxon for
"(1) breach of [the] statutory duty to properly plug a well[] [and]
(2) breach of [the] statutory duty not to commit waste."173
Section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code provides:
A party who owns an interest in property or production that may be
damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter ...
or another law of this state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order
of the commission may sue for and recover damages and have any
other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity. 174
The Texas Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute cre-
ates a private cause of action.175 However, in this case, Emerald's com-
plaints about the actions of Exxon did not constitute waste. 176 "Taking
Emerald's allegations as true, they do not constitute waste under the Nat-
ural Resources Code because Exxon's alleged conduct did not cause the
loss of oil or escape of gas."' 77
Section 85.321 also creates a private cause of action for violating Rail-
road Commission rules regulating plugging.178 The supreme court first
analyzed whether Emerald had standing to maintain suit.1 7 9 The su-
preme court explained that the statute's use of the language, "a party who
owns an interest in property ... may be damaged by another party violat-
ing the provisions of this chapter," could support different interpreta-
tions.180 The language could support an interpretation that an owner may
bring suit only for an injury concurrent with ownership.' 8' However, the
language could also support the interpretation that an owner may bring
suit for any past violation or violation concurrent with ownership. 182
To determine the meaning of the language, the supreme court looked
to the statute's predecessor, which applied common-law standards.' 83
Common law provides that:
[A] cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the in-
jury is committed. The right to sue is a personal right that belongs to
the person who owns the property at the time of the injury, and the
right to sue does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property
unless there is an express assignment of the cause of action.184
The significance of Exxon Corp. is the unequivocal holding that the
Natural Resources Code creates a private cause of action for damages
resulting from statutory violations. In dictum, the Texas Supreme Court
173. Id.
174. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (Vernon 2009).
175. Exxon Corp., 2009 WL 795760, at *2.
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id. at *4 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.045-.047 (Vernon 2007)).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *4, *2 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at *4.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
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also recognized that there is a statutory defense to such civil claims based
on the reasonably prudent operator standard.185 The holding that a sub-
sequent owner lacks standing to sue for pre-existing damages to realty,
absent an express assignment of the cause of action, is consistent with
long-standing precedent.186
A related case, also styled Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co.,187
indicates that false filings with the TRC will generally not support private
causes of action for fraud.188 This case is the culmination of nearly four-
teen years of litigation between royalty owners and their lessee, based on
disputes arising under leases granted in the 1950s. The leases covered
several thousand acres and included a fifty-percent royalty clause and
"stringent disclosure, development, and surrender clauses." 189 During
the term of the leases, the lessee and successor lessees (collectively "Ex-
xon") "drilled 121 wells and produced at least 15 million barrels of oil and
more than 65 billion cubic feet of gas, resulting in the payment of more
than $43 million in royalties."190 As the field began to decline, Exxon
sought to amend the leases and reduce the royalty. The royalty owners
refused, and negotiations continued for years, increasing in intensity as
Exxon's threat to plug and abandon became more imminent. The royalty
owners identified other oil companies interested in taking over the leases,
including the predecessor to Emerald Oil & Gas, L.P. (Emerald). The
royalty owners urged Exxon to sell or transfer its interest to Emerald or
some other company. 191
Because Exxon determined that the leases were no longer profitable,
Exxon finally began plugging wells in 1989.192 The royalty owners
threatened to sue Exxon in August of 1990 if Exxon plugged any wells
that were capable of producing in paying quantities as to the interest of
the royalty owners. The royalty owners threatened to sue under the
leases and common law and to sue for waste. 193 As Exxon plugged the
wells, it disclosed the plugging methods for each well in a plugging report
on Form W-3 filed with the TRC.19 4 Exxon pursued the plugging project
until its completion in 1991, despite objections from the royalty owners
and offers from potential buyers. 195
Emerald had offered to purchase Exxon's interest in 1989 and again in
1990.196 After reviewing Exxon's plugging reports, Emerald acquired a
185. Id. at *2.
186. See id. at *5.
187. No. 05-1076, 2009 WL 795668, *10 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009), reh'g granted Nov. 20,
2009.
188. Id. at *8-10.
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *1-2, *3 n.5.
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *10.
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new lease from the royalty owners in 1993 and attempted to reopen the
plugged wells in 1994. Emerald's attempts proved futile because Emerald
encountered junk in the hole. In 1995, Emerald obtained Exxon's inter-
nal well records on the plugged wells from another party on an adjoining
tract and discovered that Exxon's internal records differed substantially
from the records filed with the TRC. Concluding that Exxon intention-
ally sabotaged the field, Emerald sued Exxon in . .. 1996, and the royalty
owners intervened.197
The supreme court severed the plaintiffs' negligence per se claim, along
with claims based on the statutory duties to properly plug the wells and
avoid committing waste, on the issue of whether the statutes created a
private cause of action.198 The statutory claims were resolved on the
same day in a related case also styled Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas
Co.,199 discussed above.
All of the tort claims asserted in this case that were subject to a two-
year statute of limitations were held to be barred by limitations. 200 The
remainder of the opinion focused on the alleged fraud based on the
Form W-3s filed with the TRC and the royalty owners' claim of breach of
the lease based on the development clause in the leases.201
Regarding the plaintiffs' claim of fraud based on the Form W-3s filed
with the TRC, "Exxon [did] not dispute that it plugged the wells using
non-standard plugging procedures." 2 0 2 However, it did "admit[] to cut-
ting the well casing and leaving it in the wellbore." 203 Emerald and the
royalty owners claimed that Exxon injured them by making material mis-
representations on its plugging reports, upon which the plaintiffs justifia-
bly relied.204 However, to prevail on its claim of fraud, the plaintiffs also
had to demonstrate that Exxon "made the representation with the intent
that the other party would act on that representation or intended to in-
duce the party's reliance on the representation." 2 0 5
The TRC rules provide, "Non-drillable material that would hamper or
prevent re-entry of a well shall not be placed in any wellbore during plug-
ging operations . . . . Pipe and unretrievable junk shall not be cemented
in the hole during plugging operations without prior approval by the dis-
trict director . . . ."206 Exxon obviously did not comply with this rule.
Exxon nevertheless claimed that it could not have anticipated that the
plugging reports it filed would impact future operators, because the re-
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id. at *3.
199. No. 05-0729, 2009 WL 795760, *1-2 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009), reh'g granted Nov. 20,
2009.
200. Exxon Corp., 2009 WL 795668, at *34.
201. Id. at *4-10.
202. Id. at *2 n.6.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *8.
205. Id.




porting requirements are intended to protect against pollution and are
not intended to provide notice to future operators.207 The supreme court
rejected Exxon's argument based on the TRC's objectives for the report-
ing requirements: (1) protect the environment and (2) allow "reentry into
the wells for commercial purposes." 208
Although the supreme court accepted Emerald's argument that false
information in the plugging records could reasonably induce detrimental
reliance, the supreme court stated that this alone did not establish that
Exxon intended to induce the plaintiffs' reliance. 209 Rather, the plaintiffs
"must show an especial likelihood that the party who made the misstate-
ment knew the claimant would rely on the information in the type of
transaction the defendant contemplated." 2 1 0 This is a specific, focused
inquiry. Relying upon public information as part of a general industry
practice, which information turns out to be false, is, as a matter of law,
insufficient.211 The inquiry is "not satisfied by evidence that a misrepre-
sentation may be read in the future by some unknown member of the
public or of a specific industry." 212 The supreme court found there was
some evidence that could support a finding of fraud: Emerald's earlier
attempts to acquire the wells and Emerald and the royalty owners' at-
tempts to stop Exxon's plugging. Therefore, the trial court's directed ver-
dict for Exxon on fraud was reversed and the case remanded on that
issue.213
The leases with Exxon contained a development clause requiring Ex-
xon to fully develop the leased tracts. 214 To satisfy the requirement, the
leases provided that Exxon had to "drill[ ] and complete[ ] [one well] in
each horizon or stratum capable of producing [oil or gas] in paying quan-
tities for a specified number of acres" per well. 2 1 5 As required by the
lease, Exxon drilled the required number of wells.2 16 However, the roy-
alty owners claimed that Exxon did not "complete" two productive zones,
because it failed to exploit the full potential of the tracts.217
Because the lease did not define "drill" and "complete," the supreme
court interpreted the lease through a canon of contractual construction
which holds "that technical words are to be interpreted as usually under-
stood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate, unless
there is evidence that the words were used in a different sense." 218 The
207. Exxon Corp. 2009 WL 795668 at *8.
208. Id. at *9.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 581-
82 (Tex. 2001)).
211. Id.
212. Id. at *10.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *4.
215. Id. at *5 (alteration in original).
216. Id. at *6.
217. Id. at *4.
218. Id. at *5 (quoting Barrett v. Ferrell, 550 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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supreme court held that "for a well to be considered 'drilled and com-
pleted,' . . . a hole must be dug in the ground, and if oil or gas is encoun-
tered, the casing must be perforated or otherwise prepared for
production." 2 1 9 Because Exxon drilled the required number of wells and
produced in paying quantities from the two contested zones, the supreme
court held that Exxon did not breach the leases, even though Exxon did
not fully exploit the zones' potential. 220 Exxon was not liable for breach
of the development clause of the leases.221
The significance of the case is the holding that false filings with the
TRC will not support private causes of action based on fraud, except in
very narrow circumstances. A plaintiff "must show an especial likelihood
that the party" making the false filing specifically knew the plaintiff
would rely upon the false "information in the type of transaction" con-
templated by the party making the filing.2 2 2 The case also provides a
definition of "drill and complete," which is construed to mean to drill and
perforate the hole or otherwise prepare for production.223 The conten-
tion that "complete" used in this context means to fully develop was re-
jected.224 Finally, the plaintiffs' loss on all of the two-year tort claims
based on limitations suggests that landowners should be more aggressive
about filing suit or seeking tolling agreements, regardless of the status of
on-going lease negotiations.
The Texas Supreme Court cases are likely to have the most lasting sig-
nificance simply because they generally consider novel issues or finally
settle and become the definitive precedent on the issue presented and
resolved. There are a number of cases further refining the issues sur-
rounding (1) adverse possession of the leasehold by a lessee continuing in
possession and producing after lease termination, (2) the extent to which
a well must be capable of producing before the payment of shut-in royal-
ties will be authorized and permitted to extend an oil and gas lease, and
(3) the rights to participate in proceeds downstream of the wellhead and
the obligation to bear costs incurred downstream of the wellhead. These
broad areas of inquiry are still generating controversy and should be of
continuing importance in case law for several more years.
VI. LEGISLATION 225
1. Act: Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 442, §§ 1-6, 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1031 (Vernon).226
219. Id.
220. Id. at *7.
221. Id.
222. Id. at *9.
223. Id. at *5.
224. Id.
225. Portions of the legislative section of this Article were supplied to the author by
Ben Sebree, Vice-President for Governmental Affairs, Texas Oil & Gas Association,
Austin, Texas.
226. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 89.002(a)(7), 91.019,
91.111(c), adding §§ 89.002(9), 89.002(10), 89.002(11), 89.002(12), 89.002(13), 89.021,
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Issue: Relating to the plugging requirements for inactive oil or gas
wells.
Summary: This act requires an operator of an inactive well to plug the
well "on or before the date the operator is required to renew" its organi-
zation report in accordance with applicable statues and the rules of the
TRC in effect at the time of plugging.227 The act defines an "inactive
well" as an "unplugged well with no reported production, disposal, injec-
tion, or other permitted activity" for more than twelve months.228 The
act allows a person who assumes responsibility for the physical operation
and control of an existing well up to six months from the date of the TRC
approval to transfer the ownership of the well to satisfy the plugging re-
quirements for the well or obtain a plugging deadline extension.229
The act authorizes the TRC to grant a deadline extension for plugging
an inactive well if the operator files an extension application which in-
cludes the following information: (1) written affirmation by the operator
that the electric service to the well's production site has been terminated;
(2) operator must have emptied all production fluids and purged related
piping, tanks, vessels, and equipment associated with wells that have been
inactive for more than five years but less than ten years, and operator
must have "removed all surface process equipment and related piping,
tanks, [and] tank batteries" for wells that have been inactive for ten years
or more; (3) a statement that the well is in compliance with TRC rules
and orders; and (4) a statement that the operator possesses, and can pro-
vide upon request, "evidence of a good faith claim to a continuing right to
operate the well." 230 The act requires the TRC to be prepared to grant
deadline extensions for plugging inactive wells by September 1, 2010.231
Effective: September 1, 2009.232
2. Act: Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1175, §§ 1-35, 2009
Tex. Gen. Laws 3725 (Vernon).233
Issue: "Relating to the powers and duties of the School Land Board
and the commissioner of the General Land Office" concerning the leas-
ing of minerals234
Summary: This act authorizes the prospective pooling or unitization of
"[o]il and gas underlying land that is owned by [the] state, [which] was
89.022, 89.023, 89.024, 89.025, 89.026, 89.027, 89.028, 89.029, and 89.030 (Vernon Supp.
2010).
227. § 2 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.022(a)).
228. § 1 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.002(a)(12)).
229. § 2 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.023(b)).
230. § 2 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.023(a)(1)-(3)).
231. § 2 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.029(f)).
232. § 6.
233. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 32.001(4), 32.002(a),
32.002(b), 32.061, 32.102, 32.105, 32.107(a)-(c), 32.110(a) and (c), 32.203, 32.253, 51.001(8),
51.013(b), 51.014, 51.052(e), 51.052(f), 51.052(g), 51.052(i) and 51.052(k), 51.056, 51.066,
51.070(a), 51.070(b), 51.071, 51.073, 51.086(a), 51.172(4), 51.172(7), 51.177(a), 51.180,
51.181(a), 51.181(b), 51.187(a), 51.194(a), adding §§ 32.002(a-1), 32.002(f), 32.003, 32.207,
51.001(12), 51.194(a-1), 51.194(a-2), 61.021(c) (Vernon Supp. 2010).
234. Id.
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acquired to construct or maintain a highway, road, street or alley,.., and
[is] subject to an oil or gas lease." 235
The act requires a compensatory royalty to be "paid in the same pro-
portion that the acreage of the state lease has to the acreage of the state
lease plus the acreage of a standard proration unit under statewide field
rules or, if applicable, the special field rules adopted by the [TRC] for the
field in which the well has been completed."236 The act removes the con-
dition for the state to be required to pay a compensatory royalty each
month to the Commissioner of the General Land Office after "the oil or
gas is sold and delivered from a well [that is] causing drainage or . . .
located within 2,500 feet of the leased premises and completed in a pro-
ducible reservoir under the state lease." 237
The act provides that no one, including the state and local government,
is authorized "to claim damages relating to production from a legally per-
mitted and . . . producing well" if the well is drilled before the effective
date of the act.238
Effective: June 19, 2009.
3. Act: Act of May 25, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1311, §§ 1-3, 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4717 (Vernon).239
Issue: "Relating to the authority of a gas corporation to use a public
right-of-way. "240
This act gives a gas corporation the authority "to lay and maintain lines
over, along, under, and across a public road, a railroad, railroad right-of-
way, an interurban railroad, a street railroad, a canal or stream, or a mu-
nicipal street or alley" as long as the pipeline complies with all of the
TRC's safety regulations and guidelines from the Texas Department of
Transportation. 241 The act also provides that the proposed route of a
pipeline and the proposed location of pipeline-related facilities must max-
imize, to the extent reasonably practicable, the use of "existing easements
and public rights-of-way."242 The act prohibits a municipality from as-
sessing "a charge for the placement, construction, maintenance, repair,
replacement, operation, use, relocation, or removal of a gas pipeline facil-
ity . . . under . . . a public road, highway, street, alley, stream, canal, or
other public way." 243
Effective: September 1, 2009.244
235. § 2 (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 32.002 (9-1)).
236. § ID (emphasis added) (TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 32.203)).
237. Id.
238. § 34(1).
239. Codified as amendments to TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. H§ 121.2025(a), 181.005
(Vernon Supp. 2010).
240. Id.
241. § 2 (TEX. UTIL. CODE § 181.005(a)(1)).
242. § 2 (TEX. UTIL. CODE § 181.005(c)).




4. Act: Act of May 25, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1145, §§ 1-3, 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3580 (Vernon).245
Issue: Relating to the requirement of an entity with eminent domain
power to provide property owners with landowner's bill of rights. 246
Summary: The act requires "an entity with eminent domain authority
[to] provide a copy of the landowner's bill of rights statement to a land-
owner before or at the same time as the entity first represents in any manner
to the landowner that the entity possesses eminent domain authority."247
This act also provides that an entity with eminent domain authority must
provide the property owner with a landowner's bill of rights statement no
later than seven days before the date the entity makes a final offer.248
Effective: January 15, 2010.249
5. Act: Act of May 18, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 224, §§ 1-13, 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 615 (Vernon).250
Issue: Relating to the injection and geologic storage of anthropogenic
carbon dioxide. 251
Summary: This act provides that the TRC has jurisdiction over the in-
jection and geologic storage of carbon dioxide in a reservoir that initially
produces "oil, gas, geothermal resources, or a saline formation directly
above or below the reservoir." 252 However, the jurisdiction is subject to
the review of the legislature based on the recommendations made in the
preliminary report.253
The act prohibits the "drilling or operating [of] an anthropogenic car-
bon dioxide injection well for geologic storage ... without first obtaining
the necessary permits from the [TRC]." 254 The act authorizes the TRC to
"impose fees to cover the cost of permitting, monitoring, and inspecting
anthropogenic carbon dioxide injection wells for geologic storage and ge-
ologic storage facilities." 2 5 5 The act requires that any TRC rules adopted
to implement this program should be consistent with applicable rules and
regulations adopted by federal agencies "governing the injection and geo-
logic storage of anthropogenic carbon dioxide," which includes the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 256
245. Codified as amendments to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.0112(a) (Vernon Supp.
2010).
246. Id.
247. § 1 (emphasis added) (TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.0112(a)).
248. Id.
249. § 3.
250. Codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.002(19), 27.002(20),
27.002(21), 27.002(22), 27.002(23), 27.002(24), 27.002(25), 27.051(b), 27.071, 27.072,
27.073(a), adding §§ 27.041, 27.042, 27.043, 27.044, 27.045, 27.046, 27.047, 27.048, 27.049,
27.050, 27.051(b-1) (Vernon Supp. 2010), and adding TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 91.801, 91.802, 120.001, 120.002, 120.003, 120.004 (Vernon Supp. 2010).
251. Id.
252. § 2 (TEX. WATER CODE § 27.041(a)).
253. § 2 (TEX. WATER CODE § 27.042(a)).
254. § 10(b)(1)-(3).
255. § 2 (TEX. WATER CODE § 27.043).
256. § 2 (TEX. WATER CODE § 27.045(a)(1)).
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The act authorizes the TRC to issue a permit under the program if it
determines the following criteria have been satisfied: "(1) . . . the injec-
tion and geologic storage of anthropogenic carbon dioxide will not en-
danger . . . any oil, gas, or other mineral formation; (2) . . . with proper
safeguards, both ground and freshwater can be adequately protected
from carbon dioxide migration ... ; (3) ... the injection of anthropogenic
carbon dioxide will not endanger or injure human health and safety; (4)
... the reservoir into which the anthropogenic carbon dioxide is injected
... is capable of being made suitable for protecting against the escape ...
of anthropogenic carbon dioxide from the reservoir; and (5) . .. the per-
mit [applicant] meets all . . . statutory and regulatory requirements for
[issuing] the permit." 257
The act provides that the TRC has jurisdiction over the extraction of
"anthropogenic carbon dioxide stored in a geologic storage facility" and
authorizes the TRC to adopt rules to allow the carbon dioxide "to be
extracted for commercial or industrial use." 258 The act requires the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office to "prepare and file with the legis-
lature a preliminary report on a recommended framework for managing
activities [relating] to geologic storage on state-owned land." 259
Effective: September 1, 2009.260
The legislation summarized here is only a small sample of the legisla-
tion that passed and an even smaller sample of the legislation that was
proposed. The trend is toward addressing the increasing conflict between
urban land owners with no stake or only a small stake in the production
of oil and gas and an industry under increasing pressure to find and pro-
duce oil and gas competitively in an increasingly globalized marketplace.
Voting power in the Texas legislature has shifted away from the rural ar-
eas, where most of the oil and gas is found, to the urban areas, where
most of the votes are found. Therefore, the challenge is how to balance
the call for increased regulation within the urban areas with the reality
that most oil and gas operations in Texas are in rural areas.
257. § 3 (TEx. WATER CODE § 27.051(b-1)).
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